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Marital Property and the Conflict
of Laws
ROBERT NEUNER*
The conflict of laws rules regarding property relations be-
tween husband and wife center around two basic principles: (1)
the lex rei sitae is applicable to immovables,1 and (2) a change of
domicile imports a change of the marital property system.2 These
priiciples seem to be regarded as statements of soiund pplicy and
also as correct generalizations drawn from the decided cases. This
was to be expected. Most cases can be interpreted as instances of
or as exceptions to a general principle. The question of whether
one view or the other is taken depends upon the interpreter's
attitude toward the general principle. Only if he approves the
principle is he inclined to regard a case as its embodiment. Con-
sequently, no analysis of cases is possible without a previous de-
cision on the advantages or disadvantages of certain general
policies. This is particularly true of a system of case law, since
a characteristic of case law is that it is always in an unfinished
state. Many questions-very often a surprisingly large number
-are undecided. If all logically possible situations had been de-
cided it would be possible, at least logically, to ascertain the
common underlying principle-if there is one. But as long as
many questions remain open, the decided cases can be interpreted
in a double way. On the other hand, it is clear that the validity
of a principle of general policy is constantly checked by the
actual decisions. A principle of policy, which exists only in the
exceptions made to it, is probably an illusion.
I. LEX REI SITAE AND LEx DOMICILII
The rule that rights in immovables are governed by the lex
rei sitae is a heritage from feudal times. The place of the in-
Special Counsel of the Federal Communications Commission.
1. Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (1934) §§ 237, 238; Dicey-
Keith, Conflict of Laws (5 ed. 1932) 588, 597.
2. See infra notes 27, 28, 29.
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dividual in society, his duties and rights depended upon his rela-
tion to immovable property; no state could allow the application
of foreign law to rights in immovables situated within its boun-
daries without disturbing its own social structure. This justifica-
tion of the rule lost its validity several hundred years ago, but
new reasons have replaced the outmoded ones and have given a
new foundation to the old principle. There remains only one
question: Is it not necessary to restate the axiom according to
the new rationale? Is it necessary to restrict it?'
Today the rule that immovables are governed by the lex rei
sitae seems to rest on the following grounds.4 Most countries
have developed some system of recordation. Such a system can
only function if a single law, the lex rei sitae, is applied to all
matters connected with the system of recordation. This explains
the application of the lex rei sitae to all questions of transfers
inter vivos. In addition, the application of the lex rei sitae can
be justified by the argument that parties who contract with re-
gard to inimovables usually expect the application of this law.
Finally, it might be said that the enforcement of rights in im-
movables depends upon the agencies of the lex rei sitae, and
consequently their law must be followed. This last argument
begs the question; it presupposes that the agencies of the en-
forcing state insist on the application of their own law because
the lex rei sitae is the law to be applied. But as long as one
discusses policy he should ask whether they are correct in this
position. If they do insist on the application of the lex rei sitae,
it is, of course, wise policy to cede to the stronger force.
No one will pretend that these arguments are strong enough
to give that supposedly overriding general application to the
principle that rights in immovables are governed by the lex rei
sitae. It is necessary to reconsider its application in the separate
fields of law, especially in that of marital property.
First of all, what does this principle mean if it is applied
in the field of marital property? It seems to be this: If spouses
domiciled in one jurisdiction own immovables in another, their
respective rights in these immovables are determined by the lex
rei sitae and not by the law governing their property relations
in general which is, according to the prevailing opinion, the law
of the husband's domicile. If they acquire immovables during
8. Goodrich, Two States and Real Estate (1941) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 417,
419.
4. Cf. Cook, "Immovables" and the "Law" of the "Situs" (1939) 52 Harv.
L. Rev. 1246, 1247.
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the marriage the lex rei sitae, not the law of the domicile, deter-
mines the kind of interests they acquire.
In order to check this statement it is advisable to examine
the different situations.
(1) The first matrimonial domicile' is in a jurisdiction
where the common law system of separate property prevails,
and one of the spouses owns land in a community property state.
As far as I can see the cases have dealt with community systems
under which immovables owned by the spouses at the beginning
of the marriage do not fall into the community. The immovables
remain separate property. If we further consider that in almost
all jurisdictions the wife has the right to dispose of her separate
property as if she were feme sole, we discover that the practical
effect of the application of the lex rei sitae is not great. The
practical result would be the same if the lex domicilii is applied.
The immovable remains separate property. We do not know
how a dase would be decided which involves a system of "initial
and complete community property," that is, where immovables
owned by one of the spouses at the beginning of the marriage
becomes community property. The Restatement, in the illustra-
tion of Section 237, applies the traditional principle to this
situation also, but its value as prediction might be questioned.
Suppose that the lex rei sitae adheres to the principle that matri-
monial rights in immovables are governed by the lex domicilii
or the lex patriae as the German law does. Would it be wise
for an American court to apply the lex rei sitae in this situation?6
(2) The first matrimonial domicile is situated in a com-
munity property state and one of the spouses owns land in a
state where the common law system of separate property pre-
vails. The situation is analogous. Both laws agree that the land
is separate property.
(3) Immovables are acquired during the marriage by one
of the spouses in a community property state while the matri-
monial domicile is in a separate property state. Article 2400 of
5. It is usually the domicile of the husband at the moment the marriage
is concluded. Whether there are jurisdictions where the notion of "matri-
monial domicile" is defined in another way, e. g., Louisiana, shall not be
discussed in this paper. Cf. Harding, Matrimonial Domicil and Marital
Rights in Movables (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 859, 860 et seq.
6. Only in exceptional cases will an American court have to decide such
a question; e. g., in the course of the distribution of an estate or when the
value of the estate or a testamentary share has to be ascertained. Cf. Cook,
supra note 4, at 1270. The case discussed in the text is one of the exceptional
situations where the renvot should be accepted. Cf. Neuner, Policy Considera-
tions in the Conflict of Laws (1942) 20 Can. B. Rev. 479, 483.
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the Louisiana code' and Section 238 of the Restatement prescribe
the appicafion of the lex rei sitae. The conclusion seems to
follow that a newly acquired immovable is community property
if it is a matrimonial gain. But the courts have applied the
doctrine of replacement in this situation.' Under it acquisitions
made with separate property are themselves separate property.'
This doctrine has been developed for purely internal situations
and is hardly in harmony with the spirit of the community
property system. Applied to conflict of laws situations it has
the surprising consequence that no acquisition of immovable
property can ever become community property. For the money
with which the immovable is acquired necessarily belongs to one
of the spouses as his or her separate property because under the
law of their domicile nothing but separate property exists. 10 Con-
sequently the newly acquired immovable becomes separate
property of one of the spouses. Formally, the lex rei sitae is
applied, for the doctrine of replacement is a part of the domestic
law of the lex rei sitae.11 But in practice, the impact of the com-
7. It is doubtful whether this section embraces movables. See Daggett,
The Community Property System of Louisiana (1931) 109. Cf. Stanton v.
Harvey, 44 La. Ann. 511, 10 So. 778 (1890).
8. This doctrine has been called doctrine of "transformation," by Dag-
gett, op. cit. supra note 7, at 27, "source doctrine" by Jacobs, Law of Com-
munity Property in Idaho (1931) 1 Idaho L.J. 1, 37.
9. Stephen v, Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 284 Pac. 158 (1930); Kraemer v.
Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302 (1877); In re Arms' Estate, 186 Cal. 554, 199 Pac. 1053
(1921); Cressey v. Tatom, 9 Ore. 541 (1881); McDaniel v. Harley, 42 S.W.
323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897); Thayer v. Clarke, 77 S.W. 1050 (1903); affirmed 98
Tex. 142, 81 S.W. 1274 (1904); Mayor v. Breeding, 24 S.W. (2d) 542 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930); Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907);
Meyers v. Albert, 76 Wash. 218, 135 Pac. 1003 (1913). Louisiana originally
adhered to a moderate form of this doctrine, but in 1912 Article 2334 of the
Code was amended and now seems to adopt the view taken in th-common
law states with community property. See Wolfe v. Gilmer, 7 La. Ann. 583
(1852); Armorer v. Case, 9 La. Ann. 288 (1854); McKay, A Treatise on the
Law of Community Property (2 ed. 1925) 281, § 423; Daggett, op. cit. upra
note 7, at 27 et seq. Cf. Land v. Land, 14 Smedes & M. 99 (Miss. 1850).
10. But there are cases which assume that immovables acquired in a
community property state are community property although the spouses
are domiciled in a common law state. Sometimes no particular reason is
given. See, e.g., Gratton v. Weber, 47 Fed. 852 (D.C. Wash. 1891); Rush v.
Landes, 107 La. 549, 32 So. 95 (1902); Smith v. Gloyd, 182 La. 770, 162 So. 617
(1935).- Sometimes the result'is reached by the application of the presump-
tion that acquisitions are community property: Carlton v. Durr, 9 La. App.
269, 120 So. 124 (1928) (the matrimonial domicile was in another community
property state, Texas); Stanton v. Harvey, 44 La. Ann. 5111, 10 So. 778
(1890); Heidenheimer v. Loring, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 26 S.W. 99 (1894);
Mayor v. Breeding, 24 S.W. (2d) 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). The decision
in Thayer v. Clarke, 77 S.W. 1050 (1903), affirmed 98 Tex. 142, 81 S.W. 1274
(1904), shows that the presumption is rebutted by the circumstances, if the
domicile of the spouses was in a common law state. Cf. Leflar, Community
Property and Conflict of Laws (1933) 21 Cal. L. Rev. 221, 233.
11. Leflar, supra note 10, at 229; Horowitz, Conflict of Laws Problems
in Community Property (1936) 11 Wash. L. Rev. 121, 212, 222.
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munity system is restricted and the unity of the marital system
under the lex domicilii is re-established. 12
The doctrine of replacement has not been applied when lead-
ing to an expansion of the application of the lex rei sitae. A wife
domiciled in a separate property state inherited land situated in
a community property state. The land was sold for the purpose
of partition and the wife's share of the price sent into the separate
property state. It was held that the husband acquired the money
under the rule of the lex domicilii. 13 The price was not treated
as a surrogate of the immovable. It seems that the doctrine of
replacement is used in order to counteract the results following
the application of two laws to one matrimonial relation. If it
does not tend to restore the unity of the matrimonial system
under the law of the domicile it is not applied.
(4) Spouses with a domicile in a community property state
acquire land in a separate property state. Few authorities can
be found on this situation. As regards the relations between the
spouses themselves the solution of the question of who owns
newly acquired land cannot depend upon whose name the title
is taken in. It is a general principle of the common law as well
as of the civil law that the legal relations appearing in title deeds
can be rectified in order to correspond to the underlying economic
and personal relations. For example, one spouse domiciled in a
community property state takes title to land in a common law
state. If he acquired the land with community means the inter-
est of the other spouse must be protected. So far the lex domi-
cilii, as the law which generally governs the property relations
of husband and wife,14 must be applied. It decides what kind of
interest the spouses had in the price and-probably-whether the
12. This argument has been used in Hammonds v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 106 F. (2d) 420 (C.C.A. 10th, 1939), in order to include.
the doctrine of replacement in a case where a wife with the domicile in
Oklahoma rendered services in Texas and received as compensation oil
leases in Texas. It was held that these oil leases and the profits derived
therefrom are community property.
13. Newcomer v. Orem, 2 Md. 297 (1852). In the cases of Castleman v.
Jeffries, 60 Ala. 380 (1877) and Kneeland v. Ensley, 19 Tenn. 620 (1839), the
courts indicate that other forms of conversion would be treated differently.
But see Henderson v. Trousdale, 10 La. Ann. 548 (1855). For a situation in-
volving two common law jurisdictions see Glenn v. Glenn, 47 Ala. 204 (1872)
(accord) and Smith v. McAtee, 27 Md. 420 (1861) (contra). Cf. Hitchcock v.
Clendinen, 12 Beav. 534, 50 Eng. Reprints 1165 (1850), where the husband's
right to an English immovable was determined by Scottish law because it
should have been sold. But in Welch v. Tennent [1891] A.C. 639 H.L. Sc.,
the price was treated in the same way as the immovable.
14. Walker v. Marseilles, 70 Miss. 283, 12 So. 211 (1892); Hendricks v.
Isaacs, 46 Hun 239, 11 N.Y. St. Rep. 527 (1887); Dougherty v. Snyder, 15
Sergeant & R. 84 (Pa. 1826).
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purchase is to be regarded as related to the community or to
separate property. The lex rei sitae comes into play only with
respect to the technical form by which the interest of the other
spouse is protected. The appropriate means seems to be the re-
sulting or constructive trust. It has been used by a Missouri
court" which treated the husband who had acquired land with
community means as trustee for the benefit of the wife as to
one-half of the interest.
The conflict of laws rules which are discussed in the foregoing
pages determine the law governing questions of legal and equit-
able "ownership" of an interest. The question of which spouse
is to be regarded as owner if it comes to an accounting between
the spouses and what is the estate of the predeceasing spouse is
answered. But ownership is only a bundle of rights and privi-
leges. We must reckon with the possibility that a different con-
flict of laws rule may be applied to certain incidents of owner-
ship.""
How is the right to administer and to dispose of immovables
to be treated, if they belong either to one of the spouses or to the
community?17 One would expect the impact of the lex rei sitae
to be very great. If a third party concludes a contract with one
of the spouses with regard to an immovable he will probably
assume that the right of the spouse to make the contract is deter-
mined by the marital property law of the lex rei sitae. Conse-
quently the application of the lex rei sitae is justified. 8 But it
does not follow that the effects of the transaction upon the rela-
tions between husband and wife are determined by the lex rei
sitae.
15. Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314 (1848), a case where a change of domicile
had taken place. Parrott Adm'r v. Nimmo, 28 Ark. 351 (1873) applies the
same principles to a situation where two common law systems were in con-
flict; land bought in another jurisdiction with separate property of the wife
is her separate property as regards the relations between the spouses, though
the husband had taken title. See further Gidney v. Moore, 86 N.C. 484
(1882). Contra: Gooding Milling & E. Co. v. Lincoln County State Bank, 22
Idaho 468, 126 Pac. 772 (1912). In this case the lex rei sitae was applied
even to the right in a movable.
16. Cf. Horowitz, supra note 11, at 221.
17. The question which law determines the capacity of a married woman
to dispose of her property has been discussed so often that it shall not be
taken up In this paper.
18. Village of Western Springs v. Collins, 98 Fed. 933 (C.C.A. 7th, 1900);
Heine v. Mechanics' & Traders' Insurance Co., 45 La. Ann. 770, 13 So. 1
(1893); Monroig v. Parker, 6 Puerto Rico Fed. Rep. 595 (1914); Richardson
v. De Giverville, 107 Mo. 422, 17 S.W. 974 (1891). Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala.
382 (1857), holds that the mode of conveying is governed by the lex rei sitae
but that the law governing the original character of the property determines
whether both spouses must participate in the conveyance (this case involved
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Profits and fruits do not necessarily belong to the owner of
the fruitbearing object. Which law determines the right to the
profits, especially in view of the fact that the fruits and profits
of an immovable are movables: the lex rei sitae or the law gov-
erning the matrimonial relations in general? Some cases apply
the lex rei sitae.19
The question of how far contracts bind separate estate or
community property has two aspects: the relation to the creditor,
and the accounting between the spouses.
The first question is usually put in the following way: Which
law determines whether a wife's contract binds her separate
estate as far as it is composed of immovables? The courts hesi-
tate between the lex loci contractus ° and the lex rei sitae.2 1 Each
of the solutions apparently seeks to satisfy the expectations of
the parties. That accounts for the fact.that the law governing
marital property (the law of the domicile) is disregarded. Since
the application of the law of the place of making very often leads
to wholly irrational results, much can be said for the application
of the lex rei sitae.
Other principles come into play when the question arises
whether one of the spouses has a claim for reimbursement against
the other or against the community after a binding debt has been
contracted by one of them under the lex rei sitae or under the
lex loyi contractus, or if one of the spouses has loaned money to
the other spouse. If in such a case the law of the matrimonial
domicile gives a claim for reimbursement, it can be enforced
a change of domicile). Cf. further Heirs of Dohan v. Murdock, 41 La. Ann.
494, 6 So. 131 (1889), dealing with the problem of a bona fide purchaser.
19. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Skaggs, 122 F. (2d) 721 (C.C.A.
5th, 1941); Succession of Robinson, 23 La. Ann. 17 (1871). But see Succession
of Packwood, 9 Rob. 438,(La. 1845).
20. Gibson v. Sublett, 82 Ky. 596, 6 Ky. Law Rep. 645 (1885); Griswold v.
Golding, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 777, 3 S.W. 535 (1887) (in this case the court says
that the lex rei sitae would have been applied if the contract had been con-
cluded with a view to its performance in Kentucky or to its being a charge
upon the land in Kentucky); Young's Trustee v. Bullen, 19 Ky. Law Rep.
1561, 43 S.W. 687 (1897); Toof v. Brewer, 3 So. 571 (Miss. 1888); Spearman v.
Ward, 114 Pa. 634, 8 Atl. 430 (1887); Merrielles v. State Bank of Keokuk, 5
Tex. Civ. App. 483, 24 S.W. 564 (1893) (in this case and in Gibson v. Sublett,
lex domicilii and lex loci contractus coincided). Cf. Bowles v. Field, 78 Fed.
742 (D.C. Ind. 1897); Dulin v. McCaw, 39 W. Va. 721, 20 S.E. 681 (1894).
21. Shacklett v. Polk, 51 Miss. 378 (1875); Frierson v. William, 57 Miss.
451 (1879); Read v. Brewer, 16 So. 350 (Miss. 1894) (in this case the lex rei
sitae and the lex domicilii coincided); Ruhe v. Buck, 124 Mo. 178, 27 S.W.
412 (1894) (in this case the lex rei sitae and the lex fori coincided). Wick v.
Dawson, 42 W. Va. 43, 24 S.E. 587 (1896), applies both laws cumulatively, a
view which apparently has been taken in Johnston v. Gawtry, 11 Mo. App.
322 (1882), affirmed in 83 Mo. 339 (1884).
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against immovables situated in another jurisdiction.2 2 Only the
rank of this claim with regard to the claims of other creditors
is determined by the lex rei sitae.23  It is worthy of mention
that we have found again a situation where the law of the matri-
monial domicile prevails over the law of the situs.
There remains one situation where the application of the lex
rei sitae is undisputed and undisputable, that is, if after the death
of one of the spouses24 the rights of curtesy and dower have to
be ascertained.2 5  The reason is clear. These rights have the
same function as the rights arising under statutes of distribution
and succession. As long as the principle that the lex rei sitae
is held applicable to the inheritance of immovables, it must also
be held applicable to questions of curtesy and dower. Only in
this way can a harmonious settlement of the estate be achieved.
If we leave the questions of curtesy and dower aside as be-
longing to the field of inheritance law, and try to get a synoptic
view of the conflict of laws rules on marital property, we hesi-
tate to lay down the rule that the lex rei sitae governs immov-
ables. In an abstract way this statement is correct. But if we
analyze the practical application of this rule in its interaction
with certain principles of the domestic law, especially the doctrine
of replacement, we find that the practical result is often almost
the same as if the opposing conflict of laws principle that the lex
domicilii governs all matrimonial property had been applied.
This is not surprising as weighty policy considerations recommend
this principle."6 Economically and socially the property relations
between husband and wife are a whole as are systems of matri-
monial property law. When a relation which is economically a
unit is judged by different laws, contradictory results are apt to
arise. But there are, of course, situations where sound policy
requires the application of the lex rei sitae and the better solu-
22. Rush v. Landers, 107 La. 549, 32 So. 95 (1902). The cases involving
a change of domicile are discussed infra.
23. Hall v. Harris, 11 Tex. 300 (1854), a case which involved a change
of domicile and movables.
24. Or If for another reason the dower rights must be ascertained before
the dissolution of the marriage, e.g., in case of bankruptcy, see Thomas v.
Woods, 173 Fed. 585 (C.C.A. 8th, 1909).
25. Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (1934) § 248; Breslauer,
Conflict of Laws in Restriction in Freedom of Testation (1942) 27 Iowa L.
Rev. 425, 427; Falconbridge, Immovables in the Conflict of Laws (1942) 20
Can. Bar Rev. 1, 21. Examples: Nelson v. Goree's Adm'r, 34 Ala. 565 (1859);
Boyd v. Harrison, 36 Ala. 533 (1860); Ware v. Owens, 42 Ala. 212 (1868);
Ehler v. Ehler, 214 Iowa 789, 243 N.W. 591 (1932); In re Elder (1936) 3 D.L.R.
422.
26. Cf. Stumberg, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws (1932) 11
Tex. L. Rev. 53, 63.
[Vol. V
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tion seems to be to draw a line between the two conflict of laws
rules according to the policy principles which they embody.
II. CHANGE OF DoMIcILE
A change of the domicile imports a change of the system of
matrimonial property. This principle is supposed to be embodied
in the early American case of Saul v. His CreditorsV and the
English case of Lashley v. Hog.25 In spite of DeNicols v. Curlier,9
this rule is still valid in England, for this case predicates the im-
mutability of the marital property system only for the cases where
a marriage contract can be implied. But in America the practical
effects of this rule are offset by a second doctrine, namely, that
rights acquired by one of the spouses under the law of the first
matrimonial domicile remain intact and cannot be changed by the
law of the new domicile." This doctrine has even been vested
with the cloak of constitutional protection,2 ' but hardly with justi-
fication2 2 It would be strange indeed if the constitution allowed
the wife to lose all her personal property by entering into a mar-
riage in a common law jurisdiction (which it undoubtedly does),
but forbade a more rational adjustment of the relations of hus-
band and wife by the law of the new domicile after the law of
the first domicile had had its effect. It should be kept in mind
however that this doctrine, though not justifiable by the theory
of vested rights, may have another more rational basis.
27. 5 Mart. (N.S.) 569 (La. 1827). An earlier case adopting this doctrine
is Gale v. Davis' Heirs, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 645 (La. 1817). See further In re
Majot's Estate, 199 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E. 402 (1910).
28. 4 Paton 581 (1804). See Dicey-Keith, op. cit. supra note 1, at 766,
Morris, Capacity To Make a Marriage Contract in English Private Inter-
national Law (1938) 54 L.Q. Rev. 78,79. The law of Quebec is different, see
Astill v. Hallee, 4 Q.L.R. 120 (1870); Lafleur, The Conflict of Laws in the
Province of Quebec (Montreal 1898) 173; Rogers v. Rogers, 3 Lower Canada
Jurist 64 (1848).
29. [1900] A.C. 21; followed in Canada in Re Parsons (1926) 1 D.L.R.
1160; Beaudoin v. Trudel (1937) 1 D.L.R. 216.
30. Penny v. Weston, 4 Rob. 165 (La. 1843); Martin v. Boler, 13 La. Ann.
369 (1858); Doss v. Campbell, 19 Ala. 590 (1851); Estate of Higgins, 65 Cal.
407, 4 Pac. 389 (1884); In re Free's Estate, 187 Cal. 150, 201 Pac. 112 (1921);
Melvin v. Carl, 118 Cal. App. 249, 4 P. (2d) 954 (1931); Scott v. Remley, 119
Cal. App. 384, 6 P. (2d) 536 (1931); Bosma v. Harder, 94 Ore. 219, 185 Pac.
741 (1919); Blethen v. Bonner, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 585, 71 S.W. 290 (1902); Pink
v. Devlin & Co., 40 N.D. 260 (1898). See further the cases cited in note 34
and Wharton, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (3 ed. 1904) 416, § 193a.
31. In re Drishaus' Estate, 199 Cal. 369, 249 Pac. 515 (1926); In re Thorn-
ton's Estate, 1 Cal. (2d) 1, 33 P. (2d) 1 (1934).
32. The reasoning is apt to be circular: It says the husband cannot be
deprived of his property because he has a vested right. But having a
vested right means nothing but being protected from expropriation. Con-
sequently one reasons from being protected to being protected. Further, as
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In order to understand the interaction of the two principles
and to evaluate their practical effect it is advisable to distinguish
the different situations:
(1) The spouses remove their domicile from a separate
property state into a community property state. The courts
ascribe to the removal the effect of a new marriage concluded
in the new jurisdiction at the moment of the change of domicile.
Whatever the spouses own at this moment remains their separate
property, only new gains and profits become community property
and this impact of the community system is further restricted
by the effects of the doctrine of replacement discussed above.,,
A functional approach would suggest that so much of the "sep-
arate property" of the spouses as is the fruit of common labor
of the spouses before their immigration should be treated as com-
munity property. The prevailing contrary opinion which de-
clares all the property of the spouses at the moment of immigra-
tion to be and to remain separate property subjects these assets
to rules which are framed for a different type of acquisitions, for
property which the spouses have acquired independently of the
cooperation of the other spouse through inheritance, gift, and
work done before the marriage.
The unjust results of this theory are apparent in a situation
which has become typical. After a long and busy life in one of
the eastern or midwestern states the spouses move to California
in order to pass the remaining days of their lives in a milder
it is quite possible that one is protected against certain types of expropria-
tion only, even the argument that the husband was protected against certain
interferences before the removal of the domicile is inconclusive. Cf. Lyon
v. Knott, 26 Miss. 548 (1853). See further Comment (1933) 8 So. Cal. L. Rev.
221, 224.
33. In re Niccoll's Estate, 164 Cal. 368, 129 Pac. 278 (1912); In re
Warner's Estate, 167 Cal. 686, 140 Pac. 583 (1914); Douglas v. Douglas, 22
Idaho 336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912); Vardeman v. Lanson, 17 Tex. 9 (1856); Oliver
v. Robertson, 41 Tex. 422 (1874) (but income of the stock of cattle is com-
munity property); Duke v. Reed, 64 Tex. 705 (1885); McDaniel v. Harley, 42
S.W. 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897); Griffin v. McKinney, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 432,
62 S.W. 78 (1901); Freesburger v. Gazzam, 5 Wash. 772, 32 Pac. 732 (1893);
Witherill v. Fraunfelter, 46 Wash. 699, 91 Pac. 1086 (1907). But cf. Avery
v. Avery, 12 Tex. 54 (1854). The functioning of the principle is well illu-
strated by the case In re Gulstine's Estate, 166 Wash. 325, 6 P. (2d) 628 (1932)
(A couple immigrates from South Dakota into Washington and buys a farm
for $11,000. $3,000 is paid in cash with money the husband had earned in
South Dakota, the rest is paid in monthly installments. The court- says
three-elevenths of the farm are separate property of the husband, eight-
elevenths community property.) It seems that in Scotland a different doctrine
Is applied. The community embraces the entire property of the spouses at
the moment of immigration: Bell v. Kennedy, 2 M. 587, 2 Sc. R.R. 647
(1864).
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climate.4 In this situation the husband usually owns most of the
fortune of the spouses. If he dies shortly after the removal, the
widow does not get half of this fortune, because it is not com-
munity property, but only a share of the separate property, ac-
cording to the law of the new domicile on descent and distribu-
tion. The share given by Section 221 of the Probate Code is
probably smaller than the share she would have received under
the law of the first domicile and it is not protected against a
contrary disposition in the will of the husband. This rule is
perfectly rational under the assumption that the widow is pro-
vided for by half of the community property, but in our example
the condition is not satisfied, because there is no community
property which could be divided. Had the spouses immigrated
into Louisiana the widow would be even worse off. If there were
"heirs" she would get nothing at all.85
The rule that property of the spouses, though a fruit of com-
mon labor before the immigration, is separate property is a rule
of the domestic law of the new domicile. In theory the principle
that change of the domicile imports change of the matrimonial
system is observed. But the picture is different if taken from the
point of view of the practical results. Then it appears that the
field of application of the rules on community property is very
much restricted, especially in the situations analyzed above. The
practical results are almost the same as if the civil law principle
had been adhered to. The first marital property system remains
unchanged throughout the whole marriage. A good argument
can be made for this principle and it is probable that the Ameri-
can courts sensed its advantages when they reached their results
which somewhat. correspond to the civil law principle. But im-
mediately they encounter the same obstacle as the jurists of the
civil law countries: Different laws are applied to questions of
matrimonial property and to questions of devolution of estates,
34. Brunner v. Title Insurance and Trust Co., 26 Cal. App. 35, 145 Pac.
741 (1914); In re Bruggemeyer's Estate, 115 Cal. App. 525, 2 P. (2d) 534
(1931); Latterner v. Latterner, 121 Cal. App. 298, 8 P. (2d) 870 (1932); Estate
of O'Connor, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P. (2d) 1031 (1933). In Estate of Burrows, 136
Cal. 113, 68 Pac. 488 (1902) all the property had always belonged to the
husband. In re Boselly's Estate, 178 Cal. 715, 175 Pac. 4 (1918) involved two
changes of domicile. Cf. Leflar, supra note 10, at 226; Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws (2 ed. 1938) 325, approves of the reasoning of these cases.
35. Art. 924, La. Civil Code of 1870. Dirmeyer v. O'Hern, 39 La. Ann.
961, 3 So. 132 (1887). But the surviving spouse who is in necessitous circum-
stances has the right to the marital portion. Art. 2382, La. Civil Code of
1870.
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the law of the earlier domicile to the first, the law of the last
domicile to the latter.8
The removal of the domicile from a separate property state
into a community property state cannot impair the debts con-
tracted before the change of the domicile nor bring about a change
in the person of the debtor. But common creditors do not have
a vested right in the assets of their debtor. Consequently the
question arises as to what property can be attached after the
removal of the domicile. Is it only the separate property of the
spouse who was the obligee before the immigration, or is com-
munity property also liable? From the principle that after the
removal of the domicile the marital property system of the new
domicile obtains, it would follow that community property can
be charged if the claim belongs to one of the categories of debts
for which community property is liable and that it does not make
any difference that the debt originated before the removal of the
domicile.-3 But there is a distinct tendency toward a different ap-
proach. The law of the time and of the place of the creation
of the debt determines once and for all its character. 8 Conse-
quently an obligation arising while the spouses were domiciled in
a separate property state retains its character as a separate debt
and can never be enforced against community property. This
solution is again a step toward the immutability of the matri-
monial property system.
The above mentioned principles are applicable to debts which
husband and wife owe each other.33 But here an additional
problem arises. Under what conditions does the Wife enjoy the
mortgages and privileges which the law of Louisiana and other
legal systems under French and Spanish influence grant to some
of her claims? Some Louisiana decisions have denied these privi-
leges to claims which had arisen before the immigration into
Louisiana.40 The reason given for this solution, that the place and
time of the origin of the debt determines its nature, is hardly
36. See infra p. 186 et seq.
37. Le Selle v. Woolery, 11 Wash. 337, 39 Pac. 663 (1895).
38. Hyman v. Schlenker, 44 La. Ann. 108, 10 So. 623 (1892); Huyvaerts
v. Roedtz, 105 Wash. 657, 178 Pac. 801 (1919), reconcilable with the language,
but hardly with the result of Le Selle v. Woolery, 11 Wash. 337, 39 Pac.
663 (1895); Clark v. Eltinge, 29 Wash. 215, 69 Pac. 736 (1902).
39. In Bonati v. Welsh, 24 N.Y. 157 (1861) the wife was allowed to prove
such a claim against her husband's estate.
40. Arnold v. McBride, 6 La. Ann. 703 (1851); Succession of Valansart,
12 La. Ann. 848 (1857); Stewart v. His Creditors, 12 La. Ann. 89 (1857);
Eager v. Brown, 14 La. Ann. 684 (1859). Accord: In re Myer, 14 N.M. 45,
89 Pac. 246 (1907).
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correct; this would compel the court to recognize privileges created
by the law of the former domicile."1 The true reason seems to be
that "secret liens" should be avoided wherever possible. 2
(2) If spouses migrate from a community property state
into a separate property state an interesting question arises. What
happens to community property? Under the principles developed
for the inverse situation, community property remains community
property even if brought into the new jurisdiction. But that
cannot mean that the rules of administration and liability of
community property are applied after the removal of the domi-
cile.' 8 It seems much more correct to assume that the community
is dissolved and that each spouse acquires a half interest in the
assets which had been community property. This interest is pro-
tected by the legal forms provided by the new lex domicilii, that
is, by a constructive trust. 4  In the usual situation the husband
will continue to use the assets of the community in his new
domicile. Then very complicated problems of accounting arise
which have been mentioned in a decision by the court of appeals
of the eighth circuit. 5 The earnings made after the immigration
belong to the husband. Only that part of the profits which is to
be attributed to the capital investment made by the wife by leav-
ing her half of the community property in her husband's business
belongs to her. In order to ascertain this part it is necessary to
find out how much of the gains is due to the use of the husband's
personal credit and how much to the use of the invested capital,
certainly a difficult procedure.
(3) Conflicts between different systems of separate property
states are less conspicuous than those between community prop-
erty systems and separate property systems, and they tend to be-
come less so as the equality of husband and wife is increasingly
41. They were denied in Ordronaux v. Rey, 2 Sandf. Ch. 33 (N.Y. 1844);
Hall v. Harris, 11 Tex. 300 (1854).
42. This tendency becomes apparent in the case of Hyman v. Schlenker,
44 La. Ann. 108, 10 So. 623 (1892), which denied the privilege because the
lex domicilii denied it. See especially the words used by the court in Prate
v. His Creditors, 2 Rob. 501, 508 (La. 1842); and further Hall v. Harris, 11
Tex. 300 (1854).
43. Contra the words but not the result of Succession of Packwood, 9
Rob. 438 (La. 1845). This decision deals with profits earned from a plantation
in Louisiana; the case would probably be decided today otherwise after the
provision of the Code has been changed. Cf. Succession of Popp, 146 La.
464, 83 So. 765 (1919).
44. Edwards v. Edwards, 108 Okla. 93, 233 Pac. 477 (1924).
45. Johnson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 88 F. (2d) 952, 956
(C.C.A. 8th, 1937). The tax problem would disappear if the joint return of
husband and wife were introduced, but the question of ascertaining the
estates in case of death or attachment would remain.
180 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. V
obtained. Yet a fair number of conflict situations is still to be
expected. They are solved upon the same principles: Interests
and rights which one of the spouses had acquired under the law
of the first domicile retain their character; practically speaking,
property of the wife which had become the husband's property
under the law of the first domicile remains the husband's property
though the law of the new domicile has abolished the old common
law rule. Sometimes this principle works in favor of the wife.
If she had separate property under the law of the first domicile
she retains it although the law of the new domicile would treat
it differently had the marriage been concluded in its jurisdiction. 6
The doctrine of replacement is applied in this situation too; that
is, property, including immovables, acquired in the new jurisdic-
tion by means of separate property are themselves separate
property." If title has been taken in the name of one of the
spouses48 the interest of the other spouse whose means have been
employed are protected by a resulting trust. Bona fide purchasers
for value will probably acquire an indefeasible title from the
husband if they did not know and had no reason to know that the
property was separate property of the wife according to the rule
of the first domicile.4 9
The proposition that separate property remains separate
property has to be taken with caution. It does not mean that all
the rules of the first domicile on separate property are applied
after the removal of the domicile. On the contrary, the idea seems
to be that the rules of the new domicile on separate property are
applicable, e. g. the rules defining the conditions under which
46. Parrot Adm'r v. Nimmo, 28 Ark. 351 (1873); Hydrick v. Burke, 30
Ark. 124 (1875); Grote v. Pace, 71 Ga. 231 (1883); Schurman v. Marley, 29
Ind. 458 (1868); Schluter v. Bowery Say. Bank, 117 N.Y. 125, 22 N.E. 572
(1889); State v. Chatham National Bank, 10 Mo. App. 482 (1881); State v.
Smit, 20 Mo. App. 50 (1885) apply this principle to the case of an immigration
from Russia. Dubois v. Jackson, 49 Ill. 49 (1868) and Stockes v. Macken,
62 Barb. 145 (1861) to an immigration from England. In most cases the
principle worked-in favor of the husband. See e.g., Thorn v. Weatherly,
50 Ark. 237, 7 S.W. 33 (1887); Tinkler v. Cox, 68 Ill. 119 (1873); Smith v.
Peterson, 63 Ind. 243 (1878).
47. Gluck v. Cox, 90 Ala. 331, 8 So. 161 (1890); Parrot Adm'r v. Nimmo,
28 Ark. 351 (1873); Van Ingen v. Brabrook, 27 11. App. 401 (1888); Meyer
v. McCale, 73 Mo. 236 (1880); Cooper v. Standley, 40 Mo. App. 138 (1890);
Cressy v. Tatom, 9 Ore. 541 (1881) (assuming that in California the common
law is in force).
48. Mendenhall v. Walters, 53 Okla. 598, 157 Pac. 732 (1916).
49. Minor v. Cardwell, 37 Mo. 350 (1866) goes even further, it protected
the creditors of the husbands which had levied upon slaves of the wife.
But debts of the husband to the wife need not be recorded: Bank of Colum-
bia v. Walker, 14 Lea 299 (Tenn. 1884). Cf. Harding, supra note 5, at 875;
Leflar, supra note 10, at 235.
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separate property is liable for the debts of one or the other
spouse" or the rules on the administration of the wife's separate
estate by the husband."1 The result of this procedure is that a
separate estate created by the law of the first domicile is trans-
formed into a separate estate according to the law of the new
domicile.
If the existing property relations of husband and wife are not
changed by the removal of the domicile, debts which the husband
had contracted toward his wife cannot be changed either. Such
debts remain, though they never could have arisen under the law
of the new domicile.2
The working of the rules which have been discussed in the
preceding paragraphs can be judged from the case of King v.
O'Brien." Creditors of the husband levied upon the stocks of a
business which had been carried on by the wife for many years.
They succeeded. The shop had been bought shortly after the
couple had arrived from England. Under the then obtaining
English law, the money with which the shop had been bought
had belonged to the husband. From this the conclusion was
drawn that the stock and the profits of the shop became the hus-
band's property. Only "such new stock which the wife can iden-
tify and prove as having been bought on her credit and not paid
for, or with her money with the intent that the property therein
should be hers"54 was not subjected to the claims of the husband's
creditors. The result is startling. If the objects are paid for
they can be attached by the husband's creditors; if not, they are
beyond their reach. The defect of the reasoning apparently lies
in the exaggeration of the doctrine of replacement. From the
principle that the spouses keep the property they had acquired
under the law of the first domicile, it does not necessarily follow
that all gains made by the profitable use of this property belong
to its owner. It would be possible to assume that the spouse
acquires only a claim of reimbursement against the other spouse
who had used the first one's means. This is the approach of the
community property systems in their original French form.
It is worthwhile to emphasize again the main feature of the
American cases: the rule that change of the domicile imports
50. Cooper v. Standley, 40 Mo. App. 138 (1890).
51. Clanton v. Barnes, 50 Ala. 260 (1873) (law of the place of contracting);
Gilkey v. Pollock & Co., 82 Ala. 503 (1886). Cf. Brown v. Daugherty, 120 Fed.
526 (D.C. Mo. 1903). But see Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382 (1857).
52. Bank of Columbia v. Walker, 14 Lea 299 (Tenn. 1884).
53. 33 N.Y. Super. Ct. 49 (1871).
54. L.C. p. 55.
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change of the matrimonial property system has not too much
practical effect. There is a clear tendency to continue the first
matrimonial system after an immigration into a jurisdiction with
a different matrimonial property system. Where the line between
the principle of mutability and immutability of the marital prop-
erty system lies is not yet clear. For in spite of the great num-
ber of reported cases on the subject only few of the conflict situ-
ations which can arise have been decided.
III. MARRIAGE CONTRACTS
Very different considerations come into play in the cases
where the property relations between husband and wife are
wholly or partially regulated by a marriage settlement or a mar-
riage contract. The various legal systems have developed a great
variety of such contracts. As it is quite probable that different
types cannot be treated alike in a conflict of laws situation some
of the seeming contradictions which are found in the cases can
probably be explained by the necessity for treating different types
of marriage contracts differently.
The courts do not make a distinction between marriage con-
tracts and ordinary contracts when the question arises which
law governs their validity and construction. According to Eng-
lish and Scottish law it is the proper law of the contract that
governs marriage contracts and marriage settlements. The prop-
er law of a marriage contract is found according to the circum-
stances of the case; it is the law whose application corresponds
to the intentions or expectations of the parties.5 5 Failing an ex-
press declaration on the applicable law,5 6 it can be the law of the
place where the property to be settled is situated,'7 the law of the
matrimonial domicile,58 the law the forms of which have been
used by the contracting parties, 59 or the law of the place of con-
55. Este v. Smyth, 18 Beav. 112, 52 Eng. Reprint 44 (1854); Duncan v.
Canan, 18 Beav. 128, 52 Eng. Reprint 51 (1854); Byam v. Byam, 19 Beav.
58, 52 Eng. Reprint 270 (1854); In re Barnard, 56 L.T.R. 9 (1887); In re
Bankes [1902] 2 Ch. 333; In re Fitzgerald [1904] 1 Ch. 573 C. A. (connected
with a problem of qualification). Earl of Stair v. Head, 6 Dunlop 904, 3 Sc.
R.R. (2d) 995 (1844); Corbett v. Wadell, 7 Ct. of Sess. Cas. 4th Series 200
(1879).
56. In re Hernando, 27 Ch. D. 284 (1884); Montgomery v. Zarifl, 88
L.J.P.C. 20 (1919).
57. Van Grutten v. Digby, 31 Beav. 561, 54 Eng. Reprint 1256 (1862);
Viditz v. O'Hagan [1899] 2 Ch. 569; In re M6gret [1901] 1 Ch. 547.
58. Shand-Harvey v. Bennet Clark [1910] 1 Sc. L.T. 133; In re Hewitt's
Settlement [1915] 1 Ch. 228; Taillifer v. Taillifer, 21 O.R. 337 (1891).
59. Byam v. Byam, 19 Beav. 58, 52 Eng. Reprint 270 (1854); In re Hewitt's
Settlement [1915] 1 Ch. 228; In re Barnard, 56 L.T.R.G. (1887); Viditz v.
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tracting.e° Often more than one of these points of contact are
given at the same time21 Then the task of finding the proper law
is facilitated. On the other hand it has been decided that a settle-
ment can be divided into two parts subject to different laws if
there are contacts with two legal systems.12
In the American decisions this problem is less elaborately dis-
cussed. More stress is laid on the place of contracting,'s but the
practical results are much the same as an English court would
have achieved."
A special problem arises if the parties of a marriage contract
adopt the marital property system of a foreign country en bloc,
that is, if they declare that they adopt the community system of
the French Code. If such a contract has points of contact with
French law, e. g., if a part of the property of the spouses is situ-
ated in France or if the domicile of one of the spouses is in France,
such a declaration indicates that French law is the proper law of
the contract;85 but if the contract does not have any other points
of contact with the jurisdiction the matrimonial system of which
has been adopted, the question must be asked whether the law
governing the contract allows such an incorporation of a foreign
matrimonial system. Sometimes such incorporation has been
held invalid."
O'Hagan [18991 2 Ch. 569; Sawrey-Cookson v. Sawrey-Cookson's Trustee's
[1905] 8 Ct. of Sess. Cas. 157.
60. Collins v. Hector, L.R. 19 Eq. 334 (1875); Ex parte Sibeth, 14 Q.B.D.
417 C.A. (1885).
61. See the cases cited in note 55 and especially Battye's Trustee v. Battye
[1917] Sess. Cas. 385, 400.
62. Chamberlain v. Napier, 15 Ch. D. 614 (1880); In re Mackenzie [19111
1 Ch. D. 578.
63. Cf. Ford's Curator v. Ford, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 574 (La. 1824); Conner v.
Elliott, 18 How. 591 (1855); Lafitte v. Lawton, 25 Ga. 305 (1858); Hicks Exec'r
v. Skinner, 71 N.C. 539 (1874).
64. Mueller v. Mueller, 127 Ala. 356, 28 So. 465 (1900) (the law of the
first matrimonial domicile); Davenport v. Karnes, 70 Ill. 465 (1873); Spears
v. Shropshire, 11 La. Ann. 559 (1856) (law of the first matrimonial domicile
and of the place of contracting); Succession of Wilder, 22 La. 219 (1870)
(the same, but capacity and form is to be judged by the lex loci contractus);
Suarez v. De Montigny, 12 Misc. Rep. 259, 33 N.Y. Supp. 292 (1895) (law of
the place where the property to be settled is situated); Le Breton v. Miles,
8 Paige 261 (N.Y. 1840) (law of the intended domicile which was at the same
time the law the application of which was intended by the parties).
65. Le Breton v. Miles, 8 Paige 261 (N.Y. 1840) (the spouses had the
intention to return to France).
66. Bourcier v. Lanusse, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 581 (La. 1815) (the law governing
the contract was the lex rel sitae). Contra: Este v. Smyth, 18 Beav. 112,
52 Eng. Reprint 44 (1854) (proper law of the contract was English law, the
adoption of the Custom of Paris has been held valid). German Civil Code,
§ 1433, expressly forbids the incorporation of a foreign matrimonial system.
French Civil Code, § 1390, forbids the incorporation of a matrimonial system
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The proper law of a marriage contract which concerns im-
movables is in most cases the lex rei sitae 7 This leads to the
splitting up of the contract if the immovables to be settled are
situated in different jurisdictions.' 8  But it might happen that a
marriage contract has been drafted in such a way that a partition
is impossible because all its provisions are mutually interdepend-
ent. Then the principle that the lex rei sitae governs must be
sacrificed as to a part of the immovables. This principle has
further been held inapplicable if, after the conclusion of the
marriage contract, immovables are acquired in a country differ-
ent from that whose laws govern the marriage contract.6" There
are other cases where a court did not hesitate to subject im-
movables to a marriage contract governed by a law different from
that of the situs.7 ' From this it would appear that the statement
that the lex rei sitae governs marriage contracts on immovables
is too broad. Of course, the lex rei sitae is, as said before, often
the proper law of the contract. But if that is not the case, the
applicability of the lex rei sitae must be based upon specific
grounds according to the specific problem to be decided. It
seems to be applicable to the following questions: (1) It decides
what kind of interests in immovables can be created. If a mar-
riage contract under its proper law creates an interest which is
not known to the lex rei sitae, this interest will be transformed
into an interest which the lex rei sitae allows and Which is most
closely analogous to that provided by the law of the contract.
7 1
The technique developed for the cases of a migration from a com-
munity property state into a separate property state and vice
versa would be followed. (2) The lex rei sitae determines the
conditions of a transfer inter vivos
7 2
valid before, the introduction of the code. Comment (1932) 6 Tulane L. Rev.
454, 466 et seq.
67. See cases cited in note 57, supra.
68. See note 62, supra.
69. Cf. De Nicols v. Curlier [1900] A.C. 21; Kleb v. Kleb, 70 N.J. Eq.
305, 62 Ati. 396 (1905). Cf. Sanger v. Sanger, 132 Kan. 596, 296 Pac. 355 (1931)
(the court judged the validity of an antenuptial contract-a Nebraska con-
tract-by Kansas law, but it could hardly have done it without first assum-
ing the validity of the contract under Nebraska law).
70. Brown v. Ransey, 74 Ga. 210 (1884); Taillifer v. Taillifer, 21 O.R. 337
(1891). Contra: In re Pearse's Settlement [1909] 1 Ch. 304.
. 71. This principle has been applied to movables in Sherrod v. Calleghan,
9 La. Ann. 510 (1854) and Peake v. Yeldell, 17 Ala. 636 (1850).
'72. Heine v. Mechanics' & Traders' Insurance Co., 45 La. Ann. 770, 13 So.
1 (1893) (capacity to dispose of an immovable); Richardson v. De Giverville,
107 Mo. 422, 17 S.W. 974 (1891); Castro v. llies, 22 Tex. 479 (1858) (rights
of the creditors of the husband). Cf. Rochereau v. Jonau, 11 La. Ann. 598
(1856). Movables are treated differently: A bona fide purchaser of movables
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The intention of the parties to a marriage contract is rarely
limited to the regulation of the property relations while the mar-
riage lasts. In most cases the parties want at the same time to
dispose of their property after death. Many of the marriage
contracts contain express provisions on this subject; they give a
life estate to the surviving wife and the remainder to the children.
But even if a marriage contract does not contain such 'a provision,
it influences indirectly the rights of the heirs and distributees
of the spouses by rendering the estate of the spouses larger or
smaller. For example, the adoption of the community property
system in a marriage contract has often the effect of reducing
the estate of the husband by one-half. Further, under ordinary
circumstances the parties want to regulate through their contract
all their property relations until the marriage is dissolved by
divorce or death. If that is true the change of the matrimonial
domicile should not have any influence upon the marriage con-
tract.73 This appears the more plausible if one considers the fact
that the law of the first domicile by no means necessarily governs
the marriage contract.
But following Story74 American courts have often adopted a
different theory, namely, that a marriage contract embraces the
property relations of husband and wife after the change of their
domicile only if it expressly or impliedly provides for it.75 The
explanation of this surprising attitude lies in the particular fea-
tures of the cases brought before American courts. They had to
deal with continental marriage contracts of immigrants. Con-
tracts of this type are unfamiliar 76 to American judges, for
cannot rely on his belief that the husband has the power to dispose of them
even if the marriage settlement which created the right of the wife to the
purchased movable has not been recorded. Bank of United States v. Lee,
13 Pet. 107, 10 L.Ed. 81 (1839); DeLane v. Moore, 14 How. 253, 14 L.Ed. 409
(1852); O'Neill v. Henderson, 15 Ark. 235 (1854); Bernstein v. Bernstein's
Trustee, 14 S.C. 161 (Cape Colony 1897); Bosman's Trustee v. Bosman, 14 S.C.
323 (Cape Colony 1897).
73. Duncan v. Cannan, 18 Beav. 128, 52 Eng. Reprint 51 (1854); Shand-
Harvey v. Bennet Clark [1910] 1 Sc. L.T. 133. Cf. Falconbridge, Immovables
in the Conflict of Laws (1942) 20 Can. Bar Rep. 1, 23. A consequence of
this rule is that a marriage settlement which cannot be rescinded under its
proper law does not become rescindable by the removal of the matrimonial
domicile or by going into another country for the purpose of rescinding
the contract: Viditz v. O'Hagan [1899] 2 Ci. 569.
74. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (1857) §§ 143, 184, 185.
75. Besse v. Pellochoux, 73 Ill. 285 (1874); Long v. Hess, 154 Ill. 482, 40
N.E. 335 (1895); Castro v. llies, 22 Tex. 479 (1858);. Fuss v. Fuss, 24 Wisc.
256 (1869). Cf. Lashley v. Hog, 4 Paton 581, 617 (1804) dictum.
76. Cf. the remark of the court In Besse v. Pellochoux, 73 Ill. 285, 287 (1874)
(the words of the marriage contract) "have no definite signification like
well understood legal terms."
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example, an "Einkindschaftsvertrag, ' '1 7 and American judges
rarely have the means to inform themselves on the meaning of
the highly technical terms in which these contracts are expressed.
No wonder that they evaded the difficulty of interpretation by
assuming that the contract is no longer applicable after immigra-
tion into America. But if there were no particular difficulties
in understanding the foreign marriage contract the courts were
willing to extend its effects to acquisitions made after the im-
migration into the United States.78
IV. RULES ON MARITAL PROPERTY AND RULES ON SUCCESSION
As pointed out above, many marriage contracts, especially
the English marriage settlements, contain provisions on the de-
volution of the estates of the spouses in case of death. These
provisions are governed by the proper law of the marriage con-
tract which is often not the law which governs the question of
inheritance, the law of the last domicile. If the latter law contains
provisions which are in conflict with the provisions of the mar-
riage contract puzzling conflict of laws problems arise.
The general distribution approach is to apply first the rules
of the marriage contract 79 and then the rules of the last domicile,
if there is still an estate left which can be distributed.80 In some
situations the decision depends upon the construction of the mar-
riage settlement. Its interpretation might lead to the conclusion
that the beneficiary of a settlement can claim the share given by
the law of the last domicile in addition to the gift contained in
the settlement. '
The question might, however, be asked whether the marriage
contract and the law by which it is governed can entirely exclude
the application of the law of the last domicile on succession.
77. Long v. Hess, 154 Ill. 482, 40 N.E. 335 (1895).
78. DeLane v. Moore, 14 How. 253, 14 LEd. 409 (1852); Smith v. Chapell,
31 Conn. 589 (1863); Kleb v. Kleb, 70 N.J. Eq. 305, 62 Atl. 396 (1905); Murphy's
Heirs v. Murphy, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 83 (La. 1819); Decouche v. Savetier, 3 John-
son's Ch. 190 (N.Y. 1817) (in. these two cases the marriage contract itself
provided that "the Custom of Paris should govern the disposition of the
property of the parties, though the parties should thereafter settle in coun-
tries where the laws and usages were different"); Crosby v. Berger, 3 Edw.
Ch. 538 (N.Y. 1842); Scheferling v. Huffman, 4 Ohio St. 241 (1854).
79. Ford's Curator v. Ford, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 574 (1824); Estate of J. B.
Baubichon, 49 Cal. 18 (1874); Decouche v. Savetier, 3 Johnson's Ch. 190 (N.Y.
1817). Cf. McLeod v. Board, 30 Tex. 239 (1867); Foubert v. Turst, 1 Bro.
P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Reprint 464 (1703); In re Mackenzie [1911] 1 Ch. 578.
80. Cf. Townes v. Durbin, 60 Ky. 352 (1860).
81. Lashley v. Hog, 4 Paton 581 (1804). Cf. Mueller v. Mueller, 127 Ala.
356, 28 So. 465 (1900). See further Robertson, Characterization in the Con-
flict of Laws (1940) 165.
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There are certain systems of community property which contain
the provision that the community can be continued between the
surviving spouse and the children. If this is the case there is no
estate of the predeceasing spouse left which could be distributed"
and the law of the last domicile cannot come into play. As the
rules on the continuation of the community are an integral part
of the community system the sounder solution seems to be to
apply them together with the other provisions on community
property. The argument upon which a Louisiana court based a
contrary decision" is not very convincing, e. g., that the possi-
bility of the continuation was not foreseen by the contract but by
a law which was not in force at the deceased's last domicile.
This argument overlooks the fact that the contract and the law
governing its construction are one whole.
Still greater difficulties arise if the rules governing matri-
monial property come into conflict with rules of the deceased's
last domicile giving the surviving spouse or relatives an inde-
feasible right to get a part of the estate. These rules appear in
two forms. In common law jurisdictions, the widow has often
a right to take her share against the will; the civil law 'has the
institution of forced heirship. The prevailing opinion seems to
be that these rules of the law of the last domicile override the
provisions of the marriage contract, 84 and that the marriage con-
tract does not have effect as far as it violates the rules of the last
domicile on forced heirship or indefeasible statutory shares.8 5
On the other hand it has been held"6 that the exercise of a power
of appointment granted in an English settlement is not subject
to the restrictions imposed upon testamentary freedom by the law
of the last domicile. This solution seems to be correct if one
accepts the rather conceptualistic argument that the exercise of
82. Supposing that he or she did not own separate property.
83. Murphy's Heirs v. Murphy, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 83 (La. 1819).
84. Decouche v. Savetier, 3 Johnson's Ch. 190 (N.Y. 1870); Estate v. J. B.
Baubichon, 49 Cal. 18 (1874); Caruth v. Caruth, 128 Iowa 121, 103 N.W. 103
(1905); In re Florance's Will, 54 Hun 328, 7 N.Y. Supp. 578 (1889).
85. Contra: In re Hernando, 27 Ch. D. 284 -(1884). The decision in In re
Martin [19001 P. 211 C.A. presents in a certain sense the inverse situation:
Does a last will become invalid by the conclusion of a marriage if the law
governing the matrimonial relations contains a provision that former wills
are revoked if a wife enters into a marriage? The court of appeal, reversing
Sir F. H. Jeune's judgment, gave an afirmative answer, declaring that this
rule is a part of the matrimonial law. Cf. Robertson, op. cit. supra note
81, at 166; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws: Examples of Characterization
(1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 215, 227; Breslauer, supra note 25, at 441.
86. In re M6gret [19011 1 Ch. 547; Pouey v. Hordern [1900] 1 Ch. 492.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the power of appointment is an implementation of the deed or
will granting the power, not a new testamentary disposition."
If a marriage contract contains provisions to which the rule
in Shelley's case is applicable the problem arises whether this
rule has to be given the meaning of the law governing the con-
tract or of the law governing the succession. The former view
which has been taken by a Mississippi court88 seems to be prefer-
able because the parties when concluding the contract cannot
take any other rule into account.
The problems discussed in the preceding paragraphs could be
formulated as problems of qualification." For example, one could
ask the question: Is the rule in Shelley's case, the rule giving the
widow the right of election between a statutory share and a gift
in a will, the rule declaring a release of the widow's rights void,9"
or the rule under which the husband acquires his wife's movables,
a rule of the marital property law or a rule of the laws on descent
and distribution? Under this view the application of one or the
other legal system would depend on the qualification of the ques-
tion involved. But qualifications are more or less arbitrary;9 1
they are devices for bringing order into our concepts. If the
notions of "marital property law" and "laws on descent and dis-
tribution" had an a priori meaning, a decision based on the sub-
sumption of a question under one or the other concept would at
least be certain though its policy would not be understandable.
But as the definitions themselves are arbitrary the result to be
reached by the qualification is implied beforehand when the con-
cept is defined.
Another way of solving these problems must be found. For
real problems they are, as has become apparent from the examples
given. First it is necessary to know the source of the difficulty.
87. Cf. Pouey v. Hordern [1900] 1 Ch. 492, 494, where the rule is re-
stricted to special powers of appointment.
88. Carroll v. Renich, 7 Smedes & M. 798 (Miss. 1846).
89. Falconbridge, supra note 85, at 225; Characterization in the Conflict
of Laws (1937) 53 L.Q. Rev. 235, 537, 539; Immovables in the Conflict of Laws
(1942) 20 Can. Bar Rev. 1, 22.
90. Caruth v. Caruth, 128 Iowa 121, 103 N.W. 103 (1905).
91. A more detailed exposition of my views on the problem or better
problems of qualification is to be found in my book, Der Sinn der interna-
tionalrechtlichen Norm. Kritik der Qualificationstheorie. Briinn 1931, and in
Die Ankiipfung im internationalen Privatrecht (1934) 8 Zeitschrift ffir aus-
iindisches und internationales Privatrecht 31. As I understand him, Cook,
in his article, "Characterization" in the Conflict of Laws (1941) 51 Yale L.J.
191, arrives at conclusions which are similar to my opinions on the problem
of qualification. But he does not lay the same emphasis on a thorough
analysis of what the conflict of laws rule really does.
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Different laws are to be applied to questions of marital property
and to questions of descent and distribution, although these ques-
tions are economically interdependent. This type of conflict does
not arise in the common law countries as often as in the con-
tinental jurisdictions, thanks to the principle that change of the
domicile imports change of the system of matrimonial property.
This principle has the effect that generally the same law governs
both questions. But exceptional situations have been mentioned:
The doctrines of vested rights and of replacement applied in the
case of a change of domicile have the effect that in case of the
death of one of the spouses many rules of the former domicile
on marital property must be applied together with the rules of
the deceased's last domicile on descent and distribution. The
second and better known case of different laws being applicable
to questions of marital property and to problems of descent and
distribution is the case of a marriage contract, the proper.law of
which is different from the law of the deceased's last domicile.
As pointed out before, the rules on the property relations
between husband and wife have a dual function. They regulate
these relations during the marriage and they influence directly
or indirectly the distribution of the property of the spouses after
their death. The latter is the object of the rules on descent and
distribution as well. If both rules are taken from the same legal
system, consistency can be expected because a single law-making
authority, be it court or legislature, will generally create con-
sistent rules. But as soon as these rules are taken from different
legal systems, overlappings, gaps or contradictions are apt to
arise. The best way to solve these problems seems to be to deal
with the different situations one by one and to try to find a reason-
able solution upon considerations of policy. Two considerations
should be decisive: the function of the rules involved, and the
reasonableness and justice of the result reached.
The main function of the rules on dower and curtesy and on
their statutory substitutes is to provide for the surviving spouse.
Consequently the rational solution is to apply the law of the last
domicile to these questions (with the above mentioned exceptions
in favor of the lex rei sitae) however the right of the surviving
spouse might be "qualified."92 The rules granting the surviving
92. The question of qualification of the husband's rights was brought up
in two cases. The view advocated in this article has been taken in Lee v.
Belknap, 163 Ky. 418, 173 S.W. 1129 (1915) where it is said that the share of
the husband in the deceased wife's property is determined by the law of the
last domicile, whether it be common law or statute law, or, by whatever
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spouse a part or the whole of the other spouse's estate are, how-
ever, supplemented by rules which interfere during the marriage
with the property relations of husband and wife in order to secure
these rights. There is, for example, a rule in the making which
restricts gratuitous transfers of the spouse.93 The old common
law rule too, under which the husband acquires all the movables
of his wife, has as its main function the distribution of the estates
of the spouses after death. During the marriage both enjoy the
fruits of their property together, or at least they should do so.
Only after the death of one of the spouses does the question of
who was the owner become important." From this, it would fol-
low that after the death of one of the spouses all questions which-
are connected with the determination of the estate and of the
share which is to be given to the surviving spouse should be
judged by the law of the last domicile." Such a statement would
be in liarmony with the actual decided cases were it not for one
exception: the vested right theory. It is generally held that the
law of an earlier domicile is applied as far as it has created vested
rights before the change of the domicile. This has the unfortu-
nate and unjust result that husband and wife are treated differ-
ently. It is usually assumed that by common law the husband
acquires a vested right in the wife's movables"I while the wife is
name it may be called. This decision criticizes the contrary decision In
Locke v. McPherson, 163 Mo. 493, 63 S.W. 726 (1901). In the latter case the
court assumed that the distribution of the wife's estate had to be carried
out according to New York law, as the law of the wife's last domicile. The
claim of the husband to the estate was denied, because under the interpre-
tation given by the New York courts to the rights of the husband, the hus-
band takes "by virtue of his right to administer not by way of succession,
and not by force of any statute of distribution, but by force of the common
law." If consequently the Missouri conflict of laws rule prescribing the dis-
tribution of the estate according to the law of the last domicile (La. Revised
Stats. of 1899, § 254) is applied it does not find an applicable domestic rule.
The law of the last 'domicile does not give a.distributive share to the hus-
band. This decision neglects the economic and social function of the rules
providing for the surviving spouse and, in addition to that, overlooks that
under general principles New York law would have been applicable to ques-
tions of matrimonial property too.
93. Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. (2d) 966 (1931).
94. The question who has the right to dispose of the property while the
marriage lasts Is not necessarily dependent upon ownership. It is possible
that the husband has the power to dispose of the wife's property or of com-
munity property though he does not own it. It seems that either the lex
domicilii or the lex loci contractus is applicable.
95. E.g., the question whether an asset is to be regarded as a surrogatum.
Bank of Scotland v. Hall's Trustees, 16 Dunlop 1057, 1061, 8 Sc. R.R. 1232,
1236 (1854).
96. Lyon v. Knott, 26 Miss. 548 (1853); Powell v. De Blane, 23 Tex. 66
(1859).
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denied a comparable right.9 7 As soon as one recognizes that
qualifying a right as "vested" is begging the question if one
wants to deduce from it its indestructibility, the reasons for the
different treatment of husband and wife disappear and a uniform
application of the law of the last domicile appears to be feasible.
A similar argument could be applied in the cases where
spouses immigrated from a separate property state into a com-
munity property state and one of the spouses dies. Should it not
be possible to say that the rules on descent and distribution of
the last domicile presuppose that first the matrimonial gains are
divided, that they do not make sense without them, and that
consequently the part of the community property law which
gives the surviving spouse a share in the matrimonial gains
should be applied together with the laws on descent and distribu-
tion in the strict sense of the word?9 8 The vested right theory is
certainly not a serious obstacle. At least some courts have
treated institutions not according to their name but to their eco-
nomic and social function. In the case of Cooke v. Fidelity Trust
& Safety Vault Company"9 the widow had elected to take under
her husband's will. At the same time she claimed half of her
husband's real property situated in Texas, alleging that it was
community property. The court declared that the claim to half
of the real property under the system of community property
is "analogous to the dower of the common law" and is conse-
quently excluded by the election to take under the will, just as
a claim to dower in the proper sense of the word would have
been.
CONCLUSION
(1) The conflict of laws rule prescribes the application of
the marital property law, of the contract law, et cetera, of a certain
country if there exists a point of contact with this country. In
doing so it presupposes that these various groups of rules have
a certain general content and pursue certain policies. This must
be kept in mind when an abstract conflict of laws rule is applied
in a single case and when from cases a general rule is abstracted.
97. Estate of O'Connor, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P. (2d) 1031 (1933); Hairston v.
Hairston, 27 Miss. 704 (1854).
98. Such an argument was unsuccessfully invoked by counsel in In re
Arms' Estate, 186 Cal. 554, 563, 199 Pac. 1053, 1056 (1921) and in Beaudoin v.
Trudel [1937] 1 D.L.R. 216, 223.
99. 104 Ky. 478, 47 S.W. 325 (1898). See further the cases cited note 92,
supra.
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The two discussed principles, that the lex rei sitae is applicable
to immovables and that a change of domicile imparts a change of
the marital property system, have been developed together with
two principles of domestic law; the doctrine of replacement and
the vested right theory. Their interaction has the effect that
often a result is reached similar to that at which the opposing
conflict of laws principles arrive if they have to deal with domes-
tic laws which do not have a vested right theory nor a doctrine of
replacement. Consequently the argument that the cases prove
the general practicability of the spatial and temporal splitting
up of the marital property relations has lost much of its force.
It remains undisputable that many difficulties can be avoided if
only one law is applied to the whole of the property relations
between husband and wife. This tendency of simplification
comes, however, in conflict with other interests; the smooth func-
tioning of the recording system must not be disturbed, the security
of credit transactions must be safeguarded. The right approach
seems to be to define exactly the situations where special policy
considerations override the general policy of unified treatment
and to formulate special conflict of laws rules for these situations.
(2) One of the economic functions of marital property law
is to regulate the property situation of the surviving spouse after
the marriage has been dissolved. Rules on descent and distribu-
tion pursue the same ends. It often happens that laws of differ-
ent countries must be applied to questions of marital property
on one hand and to problems of descent and distribution on the
other. As these different laws cover partially the same field with
different views on policy and starting from different presupposi-
tion, difficult problems of delimitation and adjustment between
the two groups of norms arise. Conceptualistic arguments as
those which are applied by the doctrine of qualification cannot
bring these problems to a satisfactory solution. The economic
function and purpose of the various rules and the economic re-
sult of the application of two sets of rules to one situation must
receive more attention than they did up to now. Policy con-
siderations alone can be the ground upon which the system of
conflict of laws rules is to be built.'
100. See Neuner, supra note 6.
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